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Healthcare governance, professions and populism: is there a relationship? 
An explorative comparison of five European countries 
 
Abstract 
A new wave of support for populist parties and movements represents a serious threat to 
universal healthcare coverage in traditional liberal democracies and beyond. This article aims 
to contribute empirical material on the relationships between healthcare governance, 
professions and populism. It applies an explanatory cross-country comparative approach and 
uses mixed methods, including micro-level data garnered from international comparative 
databases and documents. Denmark, England, Germany, Italy and Turkey have been selected 
for comparison, reflecting different types of healthcare systems and populist movements. The 
results reveal variety in the ways populist discourses impact in healthcare. Abundant economic 
resources, network-based governance, high levels of trust in healthcare providers and doctors 
participating as insiders in the policy process seem to work as a bulwark against populist attacks 
on healthcare and professional expertise. On the other hand, poorly resourced NHS systems 
with doctors as outsiders in the policy process and major NPM reforms together with low to 
medium levels of trust in healthcare providers may be fertile ground for populist discourse to 
flourish. Our explanatory data provide hints of correlations, which may inform further studies 
to investigate causality. Yet the research highlights that healthcare governance and professions 
matter, and brings into view capacity for counteracting populist attacks on universal healthcare 
and professional knowledge. 
 
Keywords 
Health policy; Health professions; Healthcare governance; Populism; New Public 
Management reforms; European comparison 
 
Background 
Healthcare governance and policy in Europe have faced major challenges in responding to 
changing demographic needs and severe financial constraints [1]. A recent comparative 
analysis of 30 European countries, including all European Union EU-27 countries as well as 
Switzerland, Norway and Iceland, revealed that ‘measures of quality of democracy and quality 
of government had many positive associations with process and outcome indicators of health 
policy’ [2, p. 1298]. Simultaneously, a new wave of support for populist parties and movements 
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represents a serious challenge to universal healthcare coverage in traditional liberal 
democracies [3-6]. Attendant risks for global health and public health have been highlighted 
[7-11]. Yet little attention has been focused on the complex connections between health policy, 
professions and populism. A direct connection is most clearly seen in the United States, where 
the Trump administration has attempted to abandon the Affordable Care Act reforms 
(Obamacare). The situation is far more complex in Europe. Many European Union (EU) 
countries and the wider European region are experiencing the growth of strong, often right-
wing, populist movements. Nevertheless, the strength of populist movements varies 
significantly between countries, and a populist movement does not necessarily mean an 
immediate threat to universal healthcare coverage and an attack on the expertise and knowledge 
of health professionals. In Germany and Denmark, for instance, healthcare is backgrounded 
against populist attacks against the more traditional liberal institutions of the state. 
 
This paper applies a cross-country comparative approach to help deepen our understanding of 
the relationship between healthcare governance, professions and prevailing populist 
discourses. The aim is to identify, from a health systems perspective, the propitious institutional 
conditions that facilitate populism. More specifically, we consider the role of health 
professions, especially medicine, in the growth of populist discourses in the governance of 
professional performance, particularly in relation to the ways in which populism has colonised 
the implementation of governance.  
 
Clearly, governance is not the magic formula to explain highly complex conditions of growing 
populism and its impact in healthcare. Yet governance is a key policy lever to improve health 
systems performance [1] and may therefore provide deeper insights in the relationships. 
Specifically, the capacity of the health professions to act as ‘trusted’ policy experts and the 
importance of stakeholder participation are well known [12-16]. Research has also highlighted 
the transformative powers of new public management (NPM) policies and the changing 
involvement of doctors in clinical management and leadership [17-21]. These developments 
have not been previously analysed in relation to populist political parties and movements, but 
there are two obvious connections. First, populism and the changes in governance share a 
common goal, namely to tighten control of expert knowledge and professional practice [5, 6], 
albeit in varying ways and from different angles. Second, new public management, especially 
evidence-based medicine and policy-making, have transformed the connection between 
knowledge, professionalism and governance [22].  
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This article contributes new knowledge to debates about populism and explores empirically the 
relationship between healthcare governance, professions and populism. It seeks to identify 
hints of correlations which may inform further studies to identify causality. Three key 
questions/objectives guided the comparative research: 
1) to explore the nature and effects of populism and set national populist discourses in the 
wider context of healthcare institutions and governance, 
2) to draw a comparative map of selected populist discourses, 
3) to highlight particular governance practices that may either constrain or nurture populist 
policies and programmes in healthcare and which serve to undermine to role of the 
health professions, especially the expert role of doctors.  
 
Methods 
This study is explorative in nature and, to our knowledge, the first effort to empirically 
investigate the relationships healthcare between governance, professions and populism. It 
applies a cross-country comparative approach and uses mixed methods, including micro-level 
data garnered from international comparative databases and documents. Five countries have 
been selected following a strategic (purposive) sampling approach [23], comprising Denmark, 
England, Germany, Italy and Turkey. This selection of countries reflects different types of 
healthcare systems – three types of NHS systems (Anglo-Saxon countries represented by 
England, Southern European countries by Italy, and Nordic countries by Denmark), a social 
insurance system with weak corporate actors in Turkey, and a corporatist system in Germany. 
It also reflects different forms and levels of democracy and success of populist movements. 
While England, Italy and Turkey have recently witnessed a growing influence of populist 
discourses and parties, this influence has been less influential in Denmark and Germany.  
 
The first part of the paper is based on various quantitative analyses. In particular, microdata 
from the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) survey of 2011 on ’health and 
healthcare’ were used both at a descriptive level (table 2) and a multivariate level (this 
ostensibly comprised multinomial logit regressions). In particular, tables 3 and 4 synthetize the 
results of a set of regressions respectively on, the variables mostly associated to confidence, 
satisfaction and trust in the healthcare system and doctors in each country (table 3) and the 
relationship between voters’ party preferences and the evaluation of how healthcare works in 
their country (table 4). For reasons of space, the tables just report the main results or our 
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analysis. Annex I, available as online supplementary material, shows in more details the results 
of the regressions we have run. 
 
The second part of the paper is qualitative and based on document analysis performed in spring 
2018. The country-specific material was gathered by the authors who serve as country experts. 
A joint template was developed, based on major governance categories (Table 5; see also Box 
1 for further explanations): the institutional contexts of the healthcare state, levels of trust in 
healthcare, the position of doctors in the governance arrangements, NPM reforms and 
stakeholder roles, the nature and content of the populist discourse and the key actors [24]. 
 
In our analysis we focus on the medical profession for two reasons: first, because of greater 
standardisation than other health professions and homogeneity across countries, and second, 
because of the leadership role and power of doctors in the health policy process. Despite 
growing relevance of other health professional groups, especially nurses [25], these processes 
have not essentially altered the dominance of the medical profession in influencing healthcare 
governance arrangements [26].  
 
Conceptualising populism in relation to healthcare and governance 
In the present paper we define populism as a discourse which raises two important questions 
about political process. It asks: ‘who are the people’ and ‘who speaks for the people?’ [27] 
(Panizza, 2005). In answering these questions, Albertazzi and McDonnell outline how 
populism ‘pits a virtuous and homogeneous people against a set of elites and dangerous 
“others” who are depicted as depriving (or attempting to deprive) the sovereign people of their 
rights, values, prosperity, identity and voice’ [28, p.3]. These processes are typically deployed 
to legitimise policy change, such as the apparent need for welfare chauvinism in containing 
access to statutory provision [29] in order to best reflect ‘the volonté générale (general will) of 
the people’ [30, see also 9]. Populism, therefore, entails an attempt to undermine the trust that 
the ‘people’ have in traditional liberal institutions. Here we use this definition of populism and 
explore how key health actors may be portrayed in populist discourse (Table 1). 
 
Table 1. From a general populist discourse on politics and policy to a specific one on healthcare 
and health professionals 
A general populist 
discourse 
A specific populist discourse on healthcare and 
health professionals 
Potential populist policy 
solutions 
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Institutional 
distrust 
Institutional distrust focused on specific healthcare 
institutions and professions or distrust in healthcare 
institutions and professions as a “simple” result of a 
general pattern of institutional distrust 
 
The corrupted 
‘elites’ 
- Doctors  
- Managers/Bureaucrats 
- Politicians in charge of governing healthcare 
- The State  
- Private providers 
- ‘Big Pharma’  
- More freedom of choice for 
the “people” (consumerism) 
- More direct control of the 
“people” on all the 
healthcare actors 
(empowerment) 
- Less State involvement in 
healthcare (although not 
always the case) 
The ‘outsiders’ 
- Patients who are “outsiders” (migrants, people 
belong to minorities) behave as “free riders”: they 
take more out than they put in and they try to exploit 
their position 
- ‘Welfare chauvinism’ 
- Health professionals who are ‘outsiders’ (migrants, 
people who belong to minorities) steal jobs from the 
(unemployed) ‘people’ 
- Restricting the access of 
‘outsiders’ to the healthcare 
labour market 
Source: authors’ own table based on the literature 
 
Populist notions of ‘corrupted elites’ in healthcare may refer to the following actors. Doctors, 
portrayed as exploiting their knowledge and position in order to gain more power and economic 
resources at the expenses of patients (the ‘people’) [3, 9]. This rhetoric is evident in the drive 
to patient-centred medicine [31]. Similarly, healthcare managers and bureaucrats exploiting 
their position in order to improve their economic well-being through NPM governance. 
Moreover, they may be all be accused of being corrupt in relation to aligning with private 
commercial interests who seek to sell their products into public healthcare systems. 
Furthermore, populists might portray ‘big pharma’ companies, or private healthcare providers 
as selling useless and/or dangerous healthcare cures [32] perhaps in order to make a profit. 
Moreover, populist rhetoric may focus more generally on the genitive role of the state, which 
takes away freedom of choice in healthcare from the ‘people’ and makes these decisions on 
their behalf. 
 
In addition, so called ‘outsiders’ (e.g. migrants, black and minority ethnic groups) may be the 
focus of the populist discourse in relation to entitlement and access to healthcare. Outsiders 
can be portrayed as individuals exploiting their access to healthcare (i.e. not paying enough for 
the extensive use they make of it) and thereby making healthcare more expensive to the general 
population. ‘Outsiders’ could also be depicted as being a threat to healthcare workers, as 
outsiders may be portrayed as taking away jobs from the ‘people’ or creating an ‘unfair’ level 
of competition for health and social care jobs, through an often-repeated rhetoric around their 
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enforced acceptance of lower wages, or their purported willingness to work under worse labour 
contracts. 
 
A populist discourse in relation to healthcare highlights the following ‘diagnosis’ and ‘policy 
solutions’ to the problems raised:  
• The ‘diagnosis’: it is not simply an issue of how much a country allocates for healthcare, 
but how the resources are spent and the role played by ‘elites’ and ‘outsiders’ in 
distorting the allocation and use of scarce healthcare resources. In relation to public 
expenditure on healthcare the discourse might be different depending on the populist 
party: some parties might advocate for more expenditure (although through a chauvinist 
pattern), while others might argue it is better to spare resources and allow individuals 
and households to choose more freely by themselves. 
• The ‘policy proposal’: a mix of consumerism and empowerment, transferring more 
power to the ‘people’, coupled with ‘welfare chauvinism’ and limitation to ‘outsiders’ 
employment in the field. The result may be a universalistic access to healthcare for the 
‘people’, which, necessarily excludes those sections of the general population deemed 
as ‘outsiders’. 
 
It is important to emphasise that a populist discourse in relation to healthcare will be selective, 
focusing on certain outsiders and elites and proposing a different mix of solutions between 
consumerism, empowerment, welfare chauvinism and limitations on the access of ‘outsiders’ 
to participate in the healthcare labour market. Thus the success depends on the populist party’s 
capacity and willingness to mobilise different social groups [33].  
 
However, we assume that the effects of populism depend at least to some degree on the 
institutions of the healthcare system and the governance models. We refer to governance in a 
broad sense as a framework for negotiating policy interventions [1] and ‘navigating complex 
relationships’ [34, p.4]. Governance serves our analysis as a methodological framework, 
because it offers a systematic approach to investigate complexity across macro–micro levels of 
policy-making and stakeholder and workforce groups [1, 35-36], and facilitates comparative, 
health systems-based analysis [20]. As a methodological tool governance may therefore 
provide some guidance on how to identify empirical indicators in a situation where both models 
and data are lacking (see Box 1).  
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Box 1: Dimensions of governance and the assumed effects on populism  
Health system characteristics define the macro-level conditions and framework for governance, 
which shape the opportunities of populist agendas. Data on how this happens are currently lacking. 
We therefore use a comparative design including different types of healthcare systems to identify 
dimensions of governance which might have an effect on the power of populist agendas and their 
impact in healthcare. 
New Public Management (NPM) has shifted decision-making powers from the system level (macro-
level) to the meso-level of healthcare organisations. A common goal of NPM policies is to improve 
efficiency of healthcare provision by improving control and accountability of the health 
professionals; the professions are therefore target groups of NPM, which might affect the ways 
populist agendas matter in healthcare.  
Health professions and professionalism are the backbone of healthcare and important 
stakeholders, who serve as policy experts and knowledge producers. The different populist 
agendas share a common ‘enemy’, namely expert knowledge and scientific evidence. Health 
professional groups and strong professionalism might therefore act as a barrier against populism. 
Trust may serve as a micro-level indicator of the public sentiment, and some comparative data from 
polls are available which allow for comparison. Trust is a highly complex concept, yet one general 
assumption is that lack of citizens’ trust in government, or more generally in the state, may open 
the door for populist agendas.  
 
Results  
Comparing trust in healthcare provision and professionals 
Trust plays an important role in healthcare as a buffer to social conflict. Across countries, 
professionals, especially doctors, are among the most trusted groups [37]. We use survey data 
to empirically define and compare the relationship between trust and health professionals. Four 
questions in the ISSP 2011 survey on ‘health and healthcare’ are important: confidence in the 
national healthcare system; satisfaction with the national healthcare system; trust in doctors; 
agreement with the sentence ‘Doctors care more about earnings than patients’. 
 
These four items have been used in the following way. Table 2 describes how many people 
agree with the four statements. Table 3 reports the results of multivariate regressions indicating 
which variables are more significant in explaining the differences in each country in terms of 
trust and satisfaction with the national healthcare system and the professionals. Table 4 adopts 
a different perspective in order to obtain a broader view. The dependent variable becomes 
which party is voted for; among the independent variables there are the four items evaluating 
the healthcare system functioning and doctors’ behaviours.  
 
Denmark is the country where the population have more confidence in healthcare and doctors 
and they are generally satisfied with how their own system works. Turkey is in second place: 
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although it has a relatively high share of people who trust doctors (74.7%), most believe that 
doctors care more about their own earnings than the welfare of their patients. Italy is the country 
with the lowest level of trust and satisfaction across all four items. Germany and UK lay 
between the other countries. 
 
Table 2. Confidence, satisfaction and trust in the healthcare system and doctors (year 2011) 
Country Confidence in the 
national 
healthcare system 
Not satisfied with 
the healthcare 
system in own 
country 
Doctors can be 
trusted 
Doctors care more 
about earnings 
Denmark 57.7 20.4 79.1 23.2 
Germany 40.3 40.5 66.2 30.2 
Italy 19.7 51.5 53.4 38.7 
Turkey 52.8 36.4 74.7 41.9 
UK 31.3 26.3 76.2 15.7 
Source: authors’ elaboration, based on ISSP 2011 micro-data 
 
The main independent variables associated with the four views about healthcare and 
professionals change from one issue to the other and between countries. Nevertheless, several 
important recurrent patterns emerge (Table 3). A good health status, the feeling of happiness 
and, even more importantly, the recent use of healthcare services (from primary care to 
hospitalisation) are all associated with better evaluations of the healthcare system and doctors.  
 
Those who use healthcare have in general more positive views about it. Yet in Turkey this 
mechanism is reversed for the case of doctors; in Germany and Denmark more frequent 
healthcare users are more likely to highlight personal economic interests of doctors but 
maintain a good level of trust. Often distrust and low satisfaction seem to arise not from direct 
experience but more often from a general view on institutions [38], with a generalised level of 
low satisfaction and mistrust, with healthcare being one of them. Age and education (including 
those who are still studying) are variables positively correlated with satisfaction and trust, again 
with the partial exception of Turkey in relation to education. Another variable associated to 
distrust is unemployment. Gender seems to play a role only in relation to a lower female 
satisfaction with their own healthcare system in most countries. 
 
In sum, those experiencing economic difficulties and perhaps feeling most ‘left behind’ by the 
state tend to have negative perceptions of the healthcare system and the professionals working 
in it (apart from the case of Turkey). It is important to note that these results are independent 
from the actual use of healthcare: this variable is positively associated to trust and satisfaction. 
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Table 3. Confidence, satisfaction and trust in the healthcare system and doctors: a synthesis of 
the regressions’ results 
 
Independent 
variables 
Confidence in the national 
healthcare system 
Satisfied with the healthcare 
system in own country Doctors can be trusted 
Doctors care more about 
earnings 
 Dk Ge It Tk UK Dk Ge It Tk 
U
K Dk Ge It Tk 
U
K Dk Ge It Tk 
U
K 
Education 
(level)    -     -  +  + - + - - -  - 
Sex 
(F)      - - - -            
Age 
(years)    + + + + + + + + + + + +     - 
Health 
status + + +   + +  + + + +    - - - -  
Happiness 
 
+ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + - -    
Healthcare 
use 
 + +  + + +   +  +  - + - -    
Person in 
education + +   +                
Domestic 
work    +     +           + 
Unemploye
d      -     -     +  +  + 
+ means a positive and significant correlation between the independent variable and the dependent one;  
- means a negative and significant correlation between the two variables. 
Source: authors’ elaboration based on ISSP 2001 micro-data; the regressions results with detailed information on 
coefficients and significance can be looked at in Annex 1 in the online supplementary material 
 
Table 4 goes one step further and shows the relationship between individuals’ political party 
preferences and the evaluation of how healthcare works in a given country. Using as a base 
reference Left – Center Left parties, we can see that Centre-Liberal parties’ voters as well as 
Conservative parties’ voters are often as much satisfied and have confidence in the healthcare 
system and doctors as those voting for Centre-Left parties, if not more in some countries (the 
UK and Turkey). Both far Right parties and Far Left parties (when data are available and usable 
due to a large enough sample size) appear to attract individuals who are more critical of the 
healthcare system (with the exception of Turkey) and the role of doctors. The same applies to 
other parties, in particular the Five Stars Movement in Italy which is often portrayed as a 
populist party. 
 
Table 4. Healthcare variables associated to the choice among political parties (m-logit 
regressions models; base outcome category: Left – Center Left parties) 
 
Independent 
variables 
Confidence in the national 
healthcare system 
Satisfied with the healthcare 
system in own country Doctors can be trusted 
Doctors care more about 
earnings 
 Dk Ge It Tk UK Dk Ge It Tk UK Dk Ge It Tk UK Dk Ge It Tk UK 
Far  
left = = =   - - -   = = =   = = =   
Center 
Liberal = =   = = +   + = =   = = =   = 
Right 
Conservativ
e 
= = = + = = + = + + + = = = + = = = - = 
Radical 
Right =   +  -   +  =   -  =   =  
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Other  
Parties*   =  =   -  =   -  =   =  = 
 Note: blank cells when data  missing or sample size too small (below 30 individuals). 
+ means a positive and significant correlation between the independent variable and the dependent one;  
- means a negative and significant correlation between the two variables; 
= means no significant correlation between the two variables. 
* Five Stars Movement for Italy and UKIP and other parties for the UK. 
Source: authors’ elaboration based on ISSP 2011 micro-data 
 
Healthcare governance, populist discourses and actors: contextualising the relationship 
This section illustrates different topics of the analysis (based on document analysis with the 
country-specific material gathered by the authors who serve as country experts) followed by a 
summary of the main results in Table 5. 
 
• Healthcare governance and expenditure 
The UK National Health Service is largely financed through general taxation, providing free 
universal (primary and secondary) healthcare, with little recourse to user charges. Historically, 
the NHS system of governance has involved strong central government control with local 
agencies taking responsibility for local planning. However, since the early 1990s a series of 
reforms have gradually extended market mechanisms into the organisation and delivery of 
health services [39, 40]. Italy has also a NHS, introduced in 1978, which was until the early 
1990s run mostly by the central government. Since then, several reforms introduced which 
have increased decentralisation, expanded marketisation and strengthened managerialisation 
[41]. 
 
Like Italy, Denmark has a decentralised NHS: five regions are responsible for providing 
hospital services and for contracting general practitioners, while municipalities offer health 
promotion and non-medical primary care services. The last decade has seen increasing 
centralisation; for example, funding primarily comes from national taxes that central 
government uses to define the substance of health services. This co-exists with elements of 
marketisation and managerialisation, like incentive payments of hospitals and purchaser-
provider splits at the municipal level [42, 43]. 
 
Germany is the classic model of a Bismarckian social health insurance system (SHI) with joint 
self-administration of the SHI funds and the SHI Physicians Associations. The medical 
profession represents the provider side and has strong self-governing powers, while nurses and 
other health professions have weak stakeholder positions. Federalism, decentralisation and 
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partnership or network-based governance are increasingly coupled with market mechanisms 
[26, 44].  
Before the 2003 reforms, Turkey had a mix of social health insurance organised by nonprofit 
insurance funds and a tax-financed primary care system. Since the reforms, it has evolved into 
a national health insurance system, with a single payer that is responsible for strategic 
purchasing from private and public providers. The medical profession and other health 
professions were not accorded a central role in the governance of the healthcare system, which 
is still dominated by a strong central government [45].  
The five countries show marked differences in terms of public per capita expenditure: the UK 
NHS spends far less than Germany and Denmark, and more than Italy and Turkey. The latter 
is the country that spends the least by far. The average yearly per capita expenditure growth in 
real terms in the last ten years (2007-2016) was around +1.5% in Denmark and +1,6% in the 
UK, higher in Turkey (+2.8%) and Germany (+3.5%) and negative in Italy (-0.3%). 
 
• NPM reforms and the position of doctors in the governance arrangements 
From the 1980s onwards both the UK NHS and, starting a decade later, the Italian health system 
have been subject to extensive managerial control and marketised restructuring as part of wider 
NPM trends. These include the creation of a purchaser–provider split in the organisation and 
delivery of services within the NHS (more in the UK case), tighter performance measurement 
and management arrangements, often tied to payment for performance incentives and 
increasing use of private providers and the expansion of a mixed economy of care [39, 41, 46].  
 
These changes have affected doctors in both countries. From their inception, doctors had to be 
coerced into the new NHS structure, and many family doctors remain as independent 
contractors, not salaried employees of the NHS. There has also been significant recent reforms 
of professional regulation and oversight, including more extensive methods of measuring and 
assessing organisational and individual performance, tighter clinical governance arrangements 
and the use of financial incentives to drive performance improvements. This has led to a range 
of market, corporate and professional logics ([47] for the UK; [21] for Italy) and also to new 
forms of involving doctors in management [18]. 
 
 14 
 
In comparison, NPM reforms in Demark have been more muted [42, 43]. In relation to hospitals 
this has included partial funding based on diagnose-related groups (DRGs), waiting time 
guarantees, a national system of quality-based accreditation as well as national care pathways 
for major diseases like cancer. Similarly, many municipalities have introduced a purchaser–
provider split. General practice has largely remained untouched by NPM and has only recently 
been included in the national system of quality-based accreditation. The consensus orientation 
continues to be strong across different levels of the healthcare system and gives doctors ready 
access to political and administrative decision making (‘public corporatism’). This integration 
of doctors works as a buffer against more radical reforms including professional governance. 
The National Board of Health, an independent public agency under the Department of Health, 
is responsible for maintaining the professional registry and for dealing with cases of 
professional misconduct, and there is no separate system of clinical governance. 
 
In Germany a number of the NPM reforms have been introduced from the 2000s onwards [44]. 
Characteristically, new forms of governing the performance of healthcare providers have been 
established and management and market logics strengthened. However, this has happened 
without any radical interventions in the governance system of joint-self-administered SHI 
funds and SHI Physicians Associations, and it has not radically changed medical power and 
the position of doctors as insiders in the policy process [22]. 
In Turkey, health reform debates since the mid-1980s have featured large in NPM ideas, such 
as encouraging competition through purchaser–provider split, expanding the role of private 
sector, reorganising the Ministry of Health, expanding the role of professional managers and 
experimenting with financial incentives to improve provider performance. But it was the 2003 
Health Transformation Program that implemented many of these ideas systematically in the 
healthcare system [48]. The post-2003 reforms also placed a new emphasis on the role of the 
patient-consumers through new mechanisms, such as patient rights’ units in the hospitals or a 
telephone hotline to enable direct expression of views and complaints [49]. At the same time, 
the reforms questioned the legitimacy of professional organisations, such as the Turkish 
Medical Association and some of the major unions, often describing them as self-interested 
actors [24]. Health professionals have remained at the margins of healthcare policy, with a clear 
trend towards centralisation and managerialism in post-2003 governance arrangements [45, 
48].  
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• Populist parties and the characteristics of populist discourse in relation to healthcare 
governance and professionals 
All five countries considered have populist parties. In Denmark, the Danish People’s Party 
(Dansk Folkeparti) is the main populist party. It gained more than 21% of the popular vote, 
making it the second largest party after the Social Democrats at the last election. Since 2003 
the party has also played an influential role in its support of centre-right minority coalition 
governments. In Germany the only relevant populist party is the radical right ‘Alternative für 
Deutschland’ (AfD). In the UK the primary populist right-wing party is UK Independence 
Party (UKIP). In the 2015 General Election it accounted for over 12% of the popular vote and 
in the last European Parliament election, it became the largest UK representative, thanks to a 
26% share of the popular vote. In Italy there are two main populist parties: The ‘League’ Party 
and the Five Stars Movement (FSM). Both parties were among the most voted for parties at 
the March 2018 general election: respectively they collected 17% and 32% of the total votes 
and are now part of the same government coalition. In Turkey, the governing Justice and 
Development Party (JDP) is a conservative right-wing party, which received 49.5% share of 
the popular vote at the November 2015 general election. While the party’s share declined to 
42.5% in the 2018 elections, it formed an alliance with the Nationalist Action Party and 
together they were able to constitute the majority in the Parliament with 52.5% of the popular 
vote. JDP has used a peculiar combination of economic and social security reforms that was 
often described as ‘populist’ or ‘neopopulist’ in the sense, that the party developed personalistic 
ties to the disadvantaged masses while implementing neoliberal market reforms [50]. 
 
In exploring the nature of populist discourse across the five countries in relation to healthcare, 
we see a number of important differences. On the one hand, in Denmark and Germany, the 
prevailing populist discourse is not specifically related to healthcare. There is also little sign 
that populist parties are seeking to portray doctors as part of the ‘corrupted elites’. However, 
migrants and asylum seekers are portrayed as the ‘outsiders’ who take away the resources and 
welfare benefits from German citizens, yet this is not connected to healthcare. Asylum seekers 
have access to basic healthcare in both countries [51]. In Germany, the programme of the AfD 
mentions health policy only briefly and in relation to policy aims which are widely accepted 
across the different parties and within the population: community-based medical care 
(wohnortnahe medizinische Versorgung), more doctors for rural areas, and support and 
expansion of the caring professions. The positive rhetoric is in stark contrasts to other 
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programmatic policy goals of the AfD, usually framed as ‘anti’ approaches (e.g. restricting the 
number of asylum seekers, closing borders). 
 
The lack of interest in using healthcare to animate a populist discourse in Denmark and 
Germany is in stark contrast to the UK, Italy and Turkey, where healthcare has played a key 
role in fuelling populist discourses. In all three countries we found a strong connection between 
the metaphor of ‘corrupted elites’ and populist parties. In Italy and Turkey this discourse 
focusses on the national level, while it has a strong anti-EU approach in the UK. This strong 
anti-EU approach (‘corrupted elites in Brussels’) merges with a discourse of the EU citizens 
and the migrants as ‘outsiders’, who are portrayed as taking away benefits from sovereign 
citizens of the UK. This nationalist discourse is especially powerful, because close 
identification with the NHS is widespread in the UK and serves as a resource for those wishing 
to manipulate and shape national identities (portraying the EU citizens as outsiders). Widely 
perceived to be a national treasure [52], these populist appeals promoted the image of a 
struggling health service that would be thriving, if it were not for the technical ‘Eurocrats’ 
demanding exorbitant payments.  
 
The most immediate example of the intersection between populism and healthcare in the UK 
is the central role that the discourse around funding of the NHS played in the 2016 UK 
European Union Membership referendum (Brexit [53]). The Vote Leave campaign claimed 
that £350 million was paid weekly to the EU, and that, post-referendum, this would be re-
directed to the NHS. This idea of an underfunded service also aligned with wider appeals for 
welfare nativism and conditionality [3], as migrants or ‘health tourists’ (European or otherwise) 
were presented as a drain upon a struggling health service. In turn, these appeals perpetuated a 
right-wing populist agenda, predicated on a claimed need to limit access to healthcare, 
evidenced in attempts to reclaim the costs of so-called health tourism from non-UK residents 
using the NHS [54]. 
 
In Turkey, by contrast, the ‘outsider’ discourse does not play any relevant role. Particularly in 
the earlier stages of health reforms when the transfer of hospitals to the Ministry of Health or 
full-time work requirements in public facilities were debated, Turkish populist discourse 
primarily constructed doctors as corrupted elites, who are self-interested. Some leaders of the 
Turkish Medical Association were also accused of being ‘anti-national’ when they criticized 
the government’s policies related to democratic rights. Justice and Development Party’s anti-
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institutionalist tendencies were most evident in relation to the role of professional associations, 
which were originally imagined as corporatist partners in the context of the social insurance 
tradition dating back to the early days of the Republic.  
 
More recent debates suggested the introduction of new regulations relating to the titles of these 
professional organisations, elections, and membership rules such as ending mandatory 
membership requirements for private sector physicians [55]. The Turkish case study revealed 
that populism may ‘grow up in the shadow of new public management’ and governance 
reforms [24]. Importantly, it may well co-exist with a commitment to strengthen universal 
healthcare coverage. What mattered most in these processes were not the policies themselves, 
but the ways new managerialist policies were implemented in the healthcare system [24]. The 
findings highlight that the link between new governance and populisms is the common attempt 
to transform the role of professions as ‘mediators’ between the state and the citizens. It may 
therefore be the case that NPM has served to open the door for populist leaders to present 
themselves as the ’real champions’ of the people. 
  
The Italian populist discourses surrounding healthcare have, on the whole, a strong anti-
institutionalist and anti-Public Health focus. The Five Stars movement (FSM) has focused on 
developing a narrative around the ‘corrupted elites’ in healthcare. The party also supported the 
so-called ‘No-Vax’ (No-Vaccination) movement. The whole debate started in Summer 2017 
when the National Parliament passed a law concerning healthcare prevention. This law made 
ten different types of vaccines compulsory for children who want to access nurseries and 
kindergartens as well as for students under 17 years old. The No-Vax movement was against 
this policy, arguing that there might be a positive correlation between vaccination and increased 
incidence of other diseases. Despite strong and vociferous arguments against the scientific and 
medical community, the primary focus of the No-Vax movement was on accusing doctors of 
being interested in doing business with ‘big pharma’.  
 
Conversely, the populist discourse of the ‘League’ Party, was based on the allegedly negative 
effects of ‘outsiders’ and less focused on attacking the ‘corrupted elites’. Migrants are seen as 
a source of costs for the healthcare system and, therefore, ‘welfare chauvinism’ and the 
reduction of the presence of migrants was a key element in the party discourse. Within this 
populist discourse, the ‘League’ has tried to attract voters from the No-Vax debate and often 
declared that the 2017 bill on compulsory vaccination will be erased [56]. 
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Table 5. Institutional contexts, healthcare governance and populism 
  Denmark UK Germany Italy Turkey 
Governance 
Decentralised NHS; 
public corporatist 
governance; 
contracted, self-
employed GPs  
  
Corporatist SHI 
system; network 
governance with joint 
self-administered SHI 
funds and SHI 
Doctors with some 
market; free choice of 
providers and 
insurance funds, no/ 
weak gatekeeping in 
primary care 
Regionalised NHS; 
contracted-out self-
employed GPs; an 
increasing role of 
private contracted-out 
provision 
SHI with a single 
payer, combining 
hierarchy and market 
modes of governing; 
majority of physicians 
work in the public 
sector, no/weak 
gatekeeping in 
primary care 
Average 
annual 
growth rate 
of public 
expenditure, 
per capita in 
real terms 
(2007-2016) 
1.5 1.6 3.5 -0.3 2.8 
Public 
expenditure 
(per-capita 
PPP) (2016) 
4,374 3,320 4,695 2,545 863 
Trust in 
doctors and 
healthcare 
Medium-High Medium Medium Low Medium-High 
Position of 
doctors in 
governance 
Doctors as insiders in 
political-
administrative 
decision-making 
across levels 
  
Doctors as insiders in 
the policy process 
Doctors as only 
partially insiders in 
the policy process 
(from a doctor-centred 
NHS to a more 
contested managers-
led NHS) 
Not integrated; self-
governance very 
limited; doctors in 
public hospitals are 
salaried civil servants; 
chief physician is 
responsible for the 
governance of medical 
services in public 
hospitals, combining 
some elements of 
professional authority 
and values with 
managerial priorities 
NPM 
reforms and 
changes in 
the 
involvement 
of 
stakeholders 
Individual reforms 
drawing on selected 
elements of 
marketisation and 
managerialism; 
involvement of 
doctors in public 
corporatism remains 
strong 
  
NPM reforms focus 
on organisational 
change to improve 
integration without 
changing the pillarised 
system of corporatist 
actors; strong medical 
profession 
Increasing 
managerialisation and 
still a limited role of 
civil society 
stakeholders; patients 
caught between 
managers and 
professionals' power  
NPM reforms 
transformed the bonds 
between the state and 
the professions 
through changes in the 
governance of 
hospitals, payment 
methods and 
complaint 
mechanisms 
Content of 
populist 
discourse 
Healthcare and 
doctors remain outside 
the populist discourse; 
migrant access to and 
use of healthcare is 
not a concern 
  
Healthcare and 
doctors do not play a 
role; the use of 
healthcare by migrants 
is not a concern 
Healthcare and 
doctors as an 
important target 
(corrupted elites); 
welfare chauvinism 
(by the League); more 
freedom of choice for 
citizens and less 
interference from 
professionals (e.g. 
vaccination) 
Populist discourse 
strong targeting 
healthcare service 
delivery and doctors 
as self-interested 
actors and 
empowering patients 
as consumers 
Populist 
actors 
Dansk Folkeparti 
(21%, 2015) UKIP (12%, 2015) 
Alternative für 
Deutschland (AfD) 
(13%, 2018) 
Five Stars Movement 
(32%, 2018); the 
League (17%, 2018) 
Justice and 
Development Party 
(42.5%, 2018) and 
alliance with 
Nationalist Action 
Party (52.5%, 2018) 
Sources: authors’ own table 
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Discussion 
Our comparative overview of the context of healthcare and governance in the five selected 
European countries reveals a wide variety of populist discourses and appeals. This is an 
important finding, because it highlights the need for a more context-specific and sensitive 
approaches to studying relationships between populism, professions and healthcare. Yet our 
comparison also highlights important institutional conditions that may nurture populist 
discourses. 
 
In Germany and Denmark, a strong cultural value of perceiving healthcare as public good 
provided for all citizens, alongside a strong public/mandatory economic investment in 
healthcare, may attenuate the appeals of populism. Especially in Germany, high levels of per 
capita expenditure, free choice of providers and the corporatist governance arrangements with 
doctors as an independent pillar and strong tradition of self-employment in ambulatory care 
may prevent an anti-institutionalist and ‘elite’ rhetoric from prevailing. It is also notable that 
populism is far stronger in the Eastern parts of Germany, yet once again, healthcare does not 
serve well to construct the Eastern citizens as ‘losers’, as they show overall higher rates of 
usage of healthcare and pharmaceuticals compared to the Western parts of Germany. However, 
growing verbal and physical violence against health professionals in the emergency services 
(as well as against fire fighters and policemen) has been reported, although not to the same 
extent as it is occurring in several other countries, including for instance Turkey [57]. 
 
In the UK, the role of the NHS as a cherished national symbol of healthcare provision embodies 
the risk of being aligned with nationalist discourses, and related to this, of ‘outsiders’ who 
exploit the NHS to the disadvantage of the British people. Here, a traditional British 
nationalism serves to construct the EU as a ‘corrupted elite’ and the EU citizens and migrants 
as ‘outsiders’. In Turkey, the traditionally weak presence of corporatist actors [45] opens a door 
for populist discourses to slip in. Within this context the medical profession serves as a proxy 
for the ‘corrupt elites’ especially in debates on efficient service provision and performance 
based payments. In Italy, the austerity cuts in the recent decade to a healthcare system, which 
was already less funded than in other countries, created an increasing problem of access and 
anger toward the NHS and its professionals. Moreover, changes in public attitudes (the No-
Vax movement outlined above is a good example) and a generalised distrust on the state and 
on doctors have fuelled a successful anti-institutionalist and anti-public health discourse by 
populist parties. 
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In summary, our comparative study highlights that the metaphors of ‘outsiders’ and ‘corrupt 
elites’ provide a dormant motif for populism in all the five countries, yet they appear to have 
been mobilised towards populist end in very different ways. In particular, the examples of the 
rise of populism in Italy with its strong anti-expert rhetoric and anti-public health approach and 
the Turkish model with its strong anti-expert rhetoric and anti-doctor focus highlight a need to 
understand populist parties and policy discourses as a very serious threat to universal healthcare 
and the traditional role and status of professionals. Negative effects are also obvious in 
England, such as skill shortages and restriction of cross-border services and shared EU 
resources [53, p. 1122]. In Denmark and Germany, public health and the health professions 
currently do not seem to be a prime target of populist policy discourses, yet verbal and physical 
attacks on individual healthcare and emergency professionals are increasingly reported in the 
media. There is an urgent need for health policy, and for public health in particular, to respond 
more effectively to the proliferation of populist discourses [9] in order to both preserve the 
important role professional expertise in the delivery of healthcare and to retain the benefits of 
universal healthcare coverage.  
 
Limitations 
This study is to our knowledge the first effort to empirically investigate the relationship 
between healthcare governance, professions and populism in Europe. It is primarily driven by 
an urgent need to overcome a dangerous silence in the health policy and public health 
community. Despite some important warnings [3-10, 58] there is a dearth of knowledge and 
both methodological approaches and data are lacking, which would allow for a systematic and 
comprehensive comparison. In this situation, our comparative study is of explanatory nature 
and has a number of important limitation. In particular, the analysis is based on strategic 
sampling and – in the absence of reliable typologies and data – the findings might look different 
for another country sample. Furthermore, the quantitative analysis is based on a number of 
different data sets which provided useful indicators for exploring our questions, but systematic 
selection or hypothesis-testing was not possible. It is important to keep the explanatory nature 
and the limitations in mind, when discussion the correlations we found between populisms, 
professions and governance. These correlations must be treated with caution and do not provide 
information on causality. Moreover, they hopefully stimulate political debate and serve as a 
prelude for later studies that investigate causality.  
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Conclusions 
This article has set out to explore the relationship between healthcare governance, professions 
and populism. Our comparative analysis reveals that this relationship may take different forms 
in different countries. The cases of Denmark and Germany highlight institutional contexts that 
may serve as a bulwark against populist discourses. Abundant economic resources, network-
based governance and doctors participating as insiders in the policy process, together with high 
levels of trust in healthcare providers – and in the German case free choice of providers and 
sickness funds – appear to attenuate the ability of populist actors to promote a discourse which 
attacks healthcare services and the role played by the medical profession. On the other hand, 
an established and cherished NHS system with doctors as outsiders in the policy process and 
major NPM reforms together with low to medium levels of trust in healthcare providers may 
be fertile ground for populist discourse to grow and flourish, as, for instance, the rise of anti-
vaccination movements in Italy show [59, 60], becoming a threat to public health. Our 
comparative study reveals correlations between healthcare governance, professions and 
populism which may serve as a basis for comprehensive comparative research. This could help 
to raise awareness in the population on the threats of growing populist movements in Europe 
and to support policymakers in building capacity to support health professional knowledge, 
healthcare and public health. 
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